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Abstract)
This) paper) draws) upon) Feenstra) and) Ma) (2007,) 2008),) to) develop) a) model) of)
asymmetric) competition) between) multiproduct) firms.) The) model) is) used) to) analyze)
how)cost) asymmetry) affects) the) equilibrium,)with)determination)of) quantity/price) as)
well) as) product) scope) per) firm.) By) treating) the) number) of) firms) as) a) continuous)
variable,) the)model) is) extended) to) account) for) the) endogenous) determination) of) the)
number) of) firms) in) a) longQrun,) monopolistically) competitive) equilibrium,) with) free)
entry)by)heterogeneous)firms.)
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INTRODUCTION)A! recent! literature! on! international! economics! has! focused! on! the! effects! of! trade! openness!when!firms!are!heterogeneous!and!multiproduct,!since!the!seminal!work!by!Melitz!(2003).!A!number! of! oligopolistic! and! monopolistically! competitive! models! have! been! proposed,! and!used! to! assess! the! theoretical! implications! of! operating! in! a! larger!market! and/or! exposing!domestic!firms!to!international!competition!(Neary,!2009).!The!same!models!could!be!fruitfully!be!employed!to!explore!other!interesting!issues,!which!may!be!of!less!interest!for!international!economics!but!still!very!relevant!for!other!fields,!like!general!industrial!economics.!!Oligopolistic!models!for!multiproduct!firms,!for!example!those!introduced!by!Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007,!2008),!Eckel!and!Neary!(2010),!Luong!(2010),!allow!for!the!endogenous!determination!of! the! number! of! product! varieties! offered! by! the! same! firm! (product! scope).! The! optimal!product!scope! is! then! found!where!marginal!profits!of!expanding!scope!are!zero.!Decreasing!returns! to! scope! are! obtained! in! Eckel! and! Neary! (2010)! by! assuming! that! firms! possess! a!“core! competence”! in! the!production! of! a! particular! variety,! becoming! less! efficient! as!more!varieties! are! produced.! Luong10! takes! a! different! but! somehow! equivalent! approach,! by!assuming!that!managing!multiple!brands!requires!organizational!and!managerial!skills,!which!are!scarce!resources!subject!to!decreasing!marginal!productivity.!!By!contrast,!Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007,!2008)!obtain!decreasing!returns!to!scope!by!just!relaxing!the! simplifying! assumption,! usually! adopted! in! most! models! based! on! the! DixitHStiglitz!framework,! of! ignoring! ownHprice! effects! on! the! aggregate! price! index.! Departing! from! this!assumption!may!be!important!when!firms!cover!a!non!negligible!share!of!the!market,!and!this!is!likely!to!be!the!case!when!firms!produce!several!products,!rather!than!just!one.!When!new!products! are!added,!demand! for!all! existing!varieties,! including! those!produced!by! the! same!firm,!decreases.!This! effect,!which! is! sometimes! referred! to! as! “cannibalization”,! reduces! the!marginal! benefit! of! expanding! the! product! scope! and,! since! the! cannibalization! effect! is!stronger!when!more!varieties!are!in!place,!this!generates!decreasing!returns!to!scope.!!The! Feenstra! and!Ma!model! is! sufficiently! general! and! analytically! tractable.! In! this!work,! I!present! the! basic! setting! of! this! model,! with! only! minor! modifications,! with! the! aim! of!
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exploring! equilibrium! in! the! market! when! firms! have! different! production! costs! and! make!different!choices!about! the!product!scope.! ! I! then!extend! the!basic!model! to!account! for! free!entry!and!monopolistic!competition!!Understanding!the!strategic!role!played!by!variations!in!the!range!of!offered!products!may!be!especially! important! for! some! markets,! like! those! of! media! services.! Many! differentiated!services! are! provided!on! the! Internet,!where! large!multiproduct! platforms,! like!Google,!may!coexist!with! smaller!providers,! typically! focusing!on!one! type!of! service.!Another!example! is!advertisementHbased!television!broadcasting.!In!Italy!(as!well!as!in!most!European!countries),!this! industry! is! concentrated,! with! three! players! covering! much! of! the! market.! After! the!transition! from! analog! to! digital! broadcasting,!which! allows! for! the! existence! of!many!more!channels!into!the!same!frequency!spectrum,!the!former!StateHowned!monopoly!RAI!expanded!its! supply! from! 3! to! 11! channels.! Private! companies!Mediaset! and! Telecom! Italia! increased!their!number!of!channels!from!3!to!7!and!from!1!to!2,!respectively.!!!!Theoretical!models!like!the!one!described!in!this!paper!can!provide!a!conceptual!framework!to!better!understand!the!strategic!response!obtained!through!variations!in!the!product!scope.!As!a! key! characteristic! of! many! markets! in! which! multiproduct! firms! compete! is! firms’!heterogeneity,!it!is!also!important!to!explicitly!address!the!issue!of!asymmetric!equilibria.!!This!is!the!primary!aim!of!the!paper,!which!is!organized!as!follows.!The!next!section!introduces!the!model!and!illustrates!its!structure.!Section!three!is!devoted!to!a!qualitative!analysis!of!an!asymmetric!duopolistic!equilibrium,!which!is!done!through!a!numerical!example.!The!model!is!then!extended!in!section!four,!to!allow!for!free!entry!by!heterogeneous!firms!in!a!monopolistic!competition!setting.!A!final!section!concludes.!!
THE)MODEL)
Basic)Setting)We!present! here! the! basic! assumptions! and! some! preliminary! results! of! the!model,! derived!from!Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007,!2008).!!There! is! a! market,! where! a! continuum! of! N! differentiated! goods! or! services,! indexed! i,! is!supplied.!Total!aggregate!expenditure!in!the!market,!R,! is!given.! !The!subHutility!function!of!a!representative!consumer!in!the!market!is!expressed!as!a!CES!function:!!
! (1)!!The! goods! or! services! are! produced! by!M! firms,! indexed! j,! each! one! supplying!Nj!varieties.!Therefore:!!
! ! (2)!!or,!if!even!the!number!of!firms!is!treated!as!a!continuous!variable:!!
! ! (3)!
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Maximization!of!(1)!under!budget!constraint!(over!R)!gives!raise!to!the!standard!expression!for!CES!demand!functions:!!! ! (4)!!where!P!is!the!CES!price!index:!!
! ! (5)!!With!a!discrete!and!finite!number!M!of!firms,!assuming!that!all!varieties!produced!by!each!firm!
j!are!priced!the!same!at!pj,!(5)!can!be!also!expressed!as:!!
! ! (6)!!It!is!easy!to!show!that!the!perceived!price!elasticity!of!demand!for!each!good!produced!by!the!jHth!firm!is!linked!to!the!market!share!sj!of!that!firm,!that!is:!!
! ! (7)!!Where:!! !(8)!!Production! takes!place!on! the!basis!of!a! technology,! involving!constant!marginal! costs!cj! per!variety! (possibly! differing! by! firm,! not! by! variety),! fixed! costs! per! variety! (possibly! scopeHdependent,! therefore!marginal!costs! in!terms!of!scope)1!Fj(Nj),!and!total!“headquarters”! fixed!costs!hj.!Therefore,!profits!of!a!representative!firm!are!given!by:!!! ! (9)!!Profit!maximization!brings!about!the!standard!markHup!rule,!where!the!elasticity!(7)!is!taken!into!account:!!! !(10)!!This! result! deserves! some! comment.! The! higher! the! market! share! of! a! firm,! the! lower! the!perceived!elasticity!(7),!the!higher!the!price!is!set!(10).!This!is!because!a!variation!in!the!price!of!a!specific!variety!changes!its!demand!but!also!changes,!in!opposite!way,!the!demand!for!all!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!In!the!original!formulation!by!Feenstra!and!Ma!this!cost!is!constant.!
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other! varieties! produced! by! the! same! firm.! The! latter! effect! is! negligible! only! if! the!market!share!is!very!low,!so!that!the!firm!is!“small”!in!the!market.!Also,!notice!that!profitHmaximizing!prices!depend!on!market!shares!(10),!but!shares!themselves!depend!on!prices!(8).!Taking!the!number!of!firms!M'and!varieties!Nj!as!given,!the!market!equilibrium!is!found!by!simultaneously!solving!(8)!and!(10)!(determining!pj!and!sj)!for!all!firms!in!the!market.!!Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007,!2008)!derive!an!optimality!condition!for!the!profit!maximizing!choice!of!Nj.! Interestingly,! the! optimal! number! of! varieties! (or! “scope”)! is! also! a! function! of! a! firm!market!share:!!! ! (11)!!Where!! !is!the!cost!of!adding!one!more!variety.!!The!optimal!scope!Nj!is!strictly!increasing!in!R,!decreasing!in!Fj!and!ε.!These!relationships!are!all!easy!to!interpret.!The!relationship!between!Nj!and!sj,!on!the!other!hand,!is!not!a!trivial!one.!Figure!1!plots!the!optimal!Nj!as!a!function!of!the!market!share'0'≤'sj'≤'1,!for!arbitrary!values!of!R!and!fj,!and!various!values!of!ε.!!
!!The! optimal! Nj! is! first! increasing,! then! decreasing,! reaching! a! maximum! whose! position!depends!on!ε.!This!is!because!there!are!two!forces!at!work.!A!higher!market!share!reduces!the!perceived!elasticity!in!(10),!thereby!determining!higher!markHups!per!variety.!This!induces!to!expand! the! scope!Nj! .! On! the! other! hand,! adding! one! more! variety! reduces! demand! for! all!existing!varieties.!This!effect!is!stronger!when!the!market!share!is!quite!significant!and!prevails!over!the!previous!one!for!sufficiently!large!values!of!sj.!!With!the!addition!of!(11)!it!is!possible!to!identify!a!(shortHrun)!equilibrium!in!a!market!of!“size”!
R,!where!M! firms!are!active.2!Each! firm! is! characterized!by! its! cost!parameters! ,!and!it!is!associated!with!equilibrium!conditions!(8),!(10)!and!(11).!In!other!words,!finding!the!market! equilibrium! entails! solving! a! system! of! 3M! equations,! for! the! determination! of! the!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008) derive an optimality condition for the profit
maximizing choice of Nj . Interestingly, the optimal number of varieties (or
“scope”) is also a function of a firm market share:
Nj =

sj(1  sj)
✏(1  sj) + sj
 
R
fj
(11)
Where fj = dFj/dNj is the cost of adding one more variety.
The optimal scope Nj is strictly increasing in R, decreasing in fj and ✏.
These relationships are all easy to interpret. The relationship between Nj and
sj , on the other hand, is not a trivial one. Figure 1 plots the optimal Nj as a
function of the market share 0  sj  1, for arbitrary values of R and fj , and
var o s values of ✏.
The optimal Nj is first increasing, then decreasing, reaching a maximum
whose position depends on ✏. This is because there are two forces at work. A
higher market share reduces the perceived elasticity in (10), thereby determining
higher mark-ups per variety. This induces to expand the scope Nj . On the
other hand, adding one more variety reduces demand for all existing varieties.
This eﬀect is stronger when the market share is quite significant and prevails
over the previous one for suﬃciently large values of sj .
With the addition of (11) it is possible to identify a (short-run) equilibrium in
a market of “size” R, whereM firms are active.6 Each firm is characterized by its
cost parameters (cj , Fj(Nj), hj), and it is associated with equilibrium conditions
(8), (10) and (11). In other words, finding the market equilibrium entails solving
a system of 3M equations, for the determination of the endogenous variables
6An implicit assumption here is that all firms get non negative profits.
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endogenous!variables!pj,'sj,!Nj.Quantities!qj!and!profits!Πj!immediately!follow!on!the!basis!of!(4)!and!(9).!!
An)Asymmetric)Duopoly)To!illustrate!the!properties!of!the!oligopolistic!equilibrium!as!described!in!the!previous!section,!and!in!particular!the!effect!of!cost!differentials!on!market!asymmetry,!let!us!consider!a!duopoly!with!parameters!specified!as!follows:!ε = 2, Ρ = 10, c2'= 1,'f2'='1.!If!we!also!set!c1'= 1!and!f1'= 1,!we!get!the!symmetric!equilibrium!with!p1'='p2'=  3,!N1'='N2'=  1.67 !and,!of!course,!s1'='s2'=  0.5.!!Now,!keep!f1'= 1!and!analyze!how!the!equilibrium!variables!change!for!different!values!of!the!marginal!cost!c1!of!the!first!firm.!Figure!3!shows!how!the!price!p1,!the!share!s1'!and!the!scope!N1!would!vary.!!
!!
Figures)3,)4)and)5)display)the)effects)of)varying)c1)on:)prices)set)by)the)two)firms)(Figure)3),)
market)shares)(Figure)4))and)number)of)varieties)provided)by)the)two)firms)(Figure)5).)!
!!
Figure 2: Eﬀects of changing c1 on Firm 1 variables
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pj , sj , Nj . Qu ntiti s qj and profits
Q
j immediately follow on e basis of (4)
and (9).
2.2 An Asymmetric Duopoly
To illustrate the properties of the oligopolistic equilibrium as described in the
previous section, and in particular the eﬀect of cost diﬀerentials on market
asymmetry, let us consider a duopoly with parameters specified as follows: ✏ =
2, R = 10, c2 = 1, f2 = 1. If we also set c1 = 1 and f1 = 1, we get the symmetric
equilibrium with p1 = p2 = 3, N1 = N2 = 1.67 and, of course, s1 = s2 = 0.5.
Now, keep f1 = 1 and analyze how the equilibrium variables change for
diﬀerent values of the marginal cost c1 of the first firm. Figure 3 shows how the
price p1, the share s1, and the scope N1 would vary.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display the eﬀects of varying c1 on: prices set by the two
firms (Figure 3), market shares (Figure 4) and number of varieties provided by
the two firms (Figure 5).
When c1 increases, prices set by both firms increases because of the direct
eﬀect of variable costs (firm 1) and because prices are strategic complements
(firm 2). The market shares move symmetrically, and when the marginal cost of
the first firm approaches zero, its market share approaches one. The evolution of
the variables Nj is more complicated. Both N1 and N2 are concave functions of
c1, reaching maxima at NMAX1 < NMAX2 . Consequently, when c1 is suﬃciently
smaller or suﬃciently larger than c2, the number of products put on the market,
N1 and N2, move to the same direction, that is, an increase in N1 is associated
with an increase in N2, and vice versa. However, for intermediate values of c1,
N1 and N2 move in an opposite way.
A similar comparative exercise can be undertaken by fixing c1 = 1, and
6
Figure 3: Eﬀects of changing c1 on prices
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of changing c1 on market shares
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!!When!c1! increases,!prices! set!by!both! firms! increases!because!of! the!direct!effect!of!variable!costs!(firm!1)!and!because!prices!are!strategic!complements!(firm!2).!The!market!shares!move!symmetrically,!and!when!the!marginal!cost!of!the!first!firm!approaches!zero,!its!market!share!approaches! one.! The! evolution! of! the! variables!Nj!is! more! complicated.! Both!N1! and!N2! are!concave!functions!of!c1,!reaching!maxima!at!N1MAX<'N2MAX.!Consequently,!when!c1!is!sufficiently!smaller! or! sufficiently! larger! than! c2,! the! number! of! products! put! on! the!market,!N1! and!N2,!move!to!the!same!direction,!that!is,!an!increase!in!N1!is!associated!with!an!increase!in!N2,!and!vice!versa.!However,!for!intermediate!values!of!c1,!N1!and!N2!move!in!an!opposite!way.!!A! similar! comparative! exercise! can! be! undertaken! by! fixing! c1=1,! and! observing! how! the!variables! of! interest! change! for! various! values! of! the! marginal! scope! cost! f1.! Figure! 6! is!analogous!of!Figure!3!and!shows!how!the!price!p1,! the!share!s1!and!the!scope!N1'!would!vary!with!f1.!!
Figure 3: Eﬀects of changing c1 on prices
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of changing c1 on product scopes
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
c1
0.5
1.0
1.5
N1,N2
observing how the variables of interest change for various values of the marginal
scope cost f1. Figure 6 is analogous of Figure 3 and shows how the price p1,
the share s1, and the scope N1 would vary with f1.
The main eﬀect of a higher set-up cost f1 is reducing the number of product
varieties oﬀered by the first firm. With a lower N1, the market share s1 declines,
increasing the perceived demand elasticity, which reduces the price p1. This
implies an increase in the quantity volumes q1, which partly compensates for
the fall in market share due to the reduction in product varieties and price. For
this reason, the market share s1 appears to be less sensitive to f1 than to c1.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the eﬀects of varying f1 on the corresponding vari-
ables (pi, sj , Nj) of the two firms.
The main diﬀerence here, with respect to the case of changing c1, can be
seen in the variation of prices. Whereas with a higher c1 we noticed that both
prices increase (Figure 3), now a higher f1 induces a reduction in the price p1,
but still an increase in the price p2. Indeed, in both cases higher costs bring
about a reduction in market share s1 and an increase in s2 (therefore, in p2).
However, whereas c1 directly aﬀects p1, the main impact of f1 is on N1, which
is partly compensated through adjustments in the price p1.
2.3 Monopolistic Competition
We consider now a monopolistic competition setting, with free entry driven by
expected profits. Firms are assumed to have diﬀerent marginal production costs
cj but, to simplify, have the same cost sub-function Fj(Nj) and no headquarters
costs hj . Unlike Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008)7 but similarly to Montagna
7These authors assume the existence of a finite, discrete number of firms, with productivity
parameters drawn from a probability distribution. In this way, the model takes a combinatorial
8
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!!The!main!effect!of!a!higher!setHup!cost!f1!is!reducing!the!number!of!product!varieties!offered!by!the!first!firm.!With!a!lower!N1,!the!market!share!s1!declines,!increasing!the!perceived!demand!elasticity,!which!reduces!the!price!p1.!This!implies!an!increase!in!the!quantity!volumes!q1!which!partly!compensates!for!the!fall! in!market!share!due!to!the!reduction!in!product!varieties!and!price.!For!this!reason,!the!market!share!s1!appears!to!be!less!sensitive!to!f1!than!to!c1.!!
Figures)7,)8)and)9)show)the)effects)of)varying)f1)on)the)corresponding)variables) )of)the)
two)firms.)!
!!
Figure 6: Eﬀects of changing f1 on Firm 1 variables
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Figure 7: Eﬀects of changing f1 on prices
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of changing c1 on product scopes
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observing how the variables of interest change for various values of the marginal
scope cost f1. Figure 6 is analogous of Figure 3 and shows how the price p1,
the share s1, and the scope N1 would vary with f1.
Th main eﬀ ct of a higher set-up cost f1 is reducing the number of product
varieties oﬀered by the first firm. With a lower N1, the market share s1 declines,
increasing the perceived demand elasticity, which reduces the price p1. This
implies an increase in the quantity volumes q1, which partly compensates for
the fall in market share due to the reduction in product varieties and price. For
this reason, the market share s1 appears to be less sensitive to f1 than to c1.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the eﬀects of varying f1 on the corresponding vari-
ables (pi, sj , Nj) of the two firms.
The main diﬀerence here, with respect to the case of changing c1, can be
seen in the variation of prices. Whereas with a higher c1 we noticed that both
prices increase (Figure 3), now a higher f1 induces a reduction in the price p1,
but still an increase in the price p2. Indeed, in both cases higher costs bring
about a reduction in market share s1 and an increase in s2 (therefore, in p2).
However, whereas c1 directly aﬀects p1, the main impact of f1 is on N1, which
is partly compensated through adjustments in the price p1.
2.3 Monopolistic Competition
We consider now a monopolistic competition setting, with free entry driven by
expected profits. Firms are assumed to have diﬀerent marginal production costs
cj but, to simplify, have the same cost sub-function Fj(Nj) and no headquarters
costs hj . Unlike Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008)7 but similarly to Montagna
7These authors assume the existence of a finite, discrete number of firms, with productivity
parameters drawn from a probability distribution. In this way, the model takes a combinatorial
8
Figure 6: Eﬀects of changing f1 on Firm 1 variables
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Figure 7: Eﬀects of changing f1 on prices
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!!
)
)The!main!difference!here,!with!respect!to!the!case!of!changing!c1,!can!be!seen!in!the!variation!of!prices.!Whereas!with!a!higher!c1!we!noticed!that!both!prices!increase!(Figure!3),!now!a!higher!
f1!induces!a!reduction!in!the!price!p1,!but!still!an!increase!in!the!price!p2.!Indeed,!in!both!cases!higher!costs!bring!about!a!reduction!in!market!share!s1!and!an!increase!in!s2!(therefore,!in!p2).!However,! whereas! c1! directly! affects! p1,! the! main! impact! of! f1! is! on! N1,! which! is! partly!compensated!through!adjustments!in!the!price!p1.'!
Monopolistic)Competition)We! consider! now! a! monopolistic! competition! setting,! with! free! entry! driven! by! expected!profits.!Firms!are!assumed!to!have!different!marginal!production!costs!cj!but,!to!simplify,!have!the!same!cost!subHfunction!Fj(Nj)!and!no!headquarters!costs!hj.!Unlike!Feenstra!and!Ma!(2007,!2008)3!but! similarly! to!Montagna! (1995)!we! assume! that! firms! are! continuously! distributed!over!a!cost!range,!so!that!G(c)!expresses!the!density!of!firms!having!marginal!production!cost!c.!!!When! the! optimal! product! scope!Nj! is! chosen! (see! (11))! the! following! condition! holds,! for!positive!Nj:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Figure 8: Eﬀects of changing f1 on market shares
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Figure 9: Eﬀects of changing f1 on product scopes
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Figure 8: Eﬀects of changing f1 on market shares
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6
k1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
s1,s2
Figure 9: Eﬀects of changing f1 on product scopes
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! ! (12)!!By! combining! the! latter! equation! with! (4)! and! (10)! it! is! possible! to! derive! a! relationship,!linking!the!marginal!cost!cj!of!a!firm!to!its!market!share!sj:!! ! (13)!!Entry! will! occur! for! all! firms! having! positive! profits,! which! applies! to! those! firms! having!production!costs!cj!lower!than!a!cutoff!level!c0.!The!latter!is!easily!identified,!by!noting!that!the!least! productive! firm!will! have! a! zero!market! share,! so! that! (13)! can!be! applied!with! so'=!0.!Furthermore,!the!market!share!of!a!firm!can!be!expressed!in!terms!of!its!relative!cost!ratio:!
! ! (14)!!Which!implies!(with!cj''≤''c0):!
! ! (15)!!Observe!that!sj’(cj)!<!0!and!sj(c0)!='so'=!0.!In! a! monopolistic! competition! model,! the! number! M! of! active! firms! is! endogenously!determined!through!the!free!entry!condition,!which!in!this!case!amounts!to!selecting!the!cutoff!cost!co!in!such!a!way!that!the!sum!(integral)!of!market!shares!sums!up!to!one.!This!condition!is:!
! !(16)!!where! c>0! is! the! minimum! marginal! cost.! Equation! (16)! can! be! solved! to! find! co.! As! a!consequence:!
! ! (17)!!For!example,!suppose!that!c=0,'ε=2,!and!firms!are!uniformously!distributed!with!density!G,!that!is!G(c)=G.!Then!(15)!becomes:!
! ! (18)!!and!(16)!becomes:!! ! (19)!!bringing!about:!! ! (20)!!
qj(pj   cj)(1  sj) = fj = dFj
dNj
cj = P

1
(✏  1)(1  sj) + 1
  ✏
1 ✏  R
(✏  1)fj
  1
1 ✏
cj
c0
=
"
1 + 1(✏ 1)(1 sj)
1 + 1(✏ 1)
# ✏
1 ✏
sj(cj) =
26641  1
1 + ✏
✓⇣
c0
cj
⌘ ✏ 1
✏   1
◆
3775
c0Z
c
sj( )G( )d  = 1
M =
c0Z
c
G( )d 
sj(cj) =
2
 p
c0  pcj
 
2
p
c0  pcj
6c0G  8 ln 2c0G = 1
c0 =
1
(6  8 ln 2)G
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! ! (21)!!In! this! setting,! each! of! the!M! active! firms! is! associated! with! a! marginal! cost! .! Its!market!share!is!determined!on!the!basis!of!(15).!The!number!of!product!varieties!is!set!through!(11),!and!the!price!of!each!product!is!given!by!(10).!!
CONCLUSIONS)Multiproduct! firms! are! not! just! large! scale! clones! of! single! product! firms.! When! market!conditions!change,!firms!revise!their!policy!in!terms!of!price,!production!volume,!quality,!etc.,!but!also!in!terms!of!the!number!of!offered!products.!The!latter!effect!is!especially!important!in!many! service! industries! (telecommunications! and! media,! in! particular).! Unfortunately,! the!industrial!organization!literature!on!multiproduct!firms!and!endogenous!scope!choice!is!quite!thin.!Strategic! scope!choice!has!been!studied!mostly! in! relation!with!entry!deterrence! (since!Judd! (1985))! or! as! a! response! to! entry! (Johnson! and! Myatt,! 2003).! The! determination! of!market! structure! when! firms! are! heterogeneous! and! multiproduct! has! not! been! directly!addressed,!to!the!best!of!my!knowledge.!!Fortunately,! some! new! models! proposed! in! the! field! of! international! economics! have! the!potential! to! fill! the! gap.! In! this! work,! I! have! discussed! a! recent!model! by! Feenstra! and!Ma!(2007,! 2008),! which! I! have! extended! and! used! to! address! the! issue! of! asymmetry! in!equilibrium.!Cost!differentials!are!at!the!basis!of!differences!in!strategic!responses!by!the!firms.!However,!costs!in!multiproduct!firms!are!multidimensional,!as!they!refer!to!the!production!of!a!specific!good,!or! to! the!addition!of! a!new!product! line,!or! to! fixed!headquarters! costs.!Firms!may!differ! in! all! these!dimensions.!Depending!on! the!nature!of! these!differences,! a! different!asymmetric!market!structure!may!emerge.!!
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M = c0G =
1
6  8 ln 2
For example, suppose that c = 0, ✏ = 2, and firms are uniformously dis-
tributed with density G, that is G(c) = G. Then (15) becomes:
sj(cj) =
2
 p
c0  pcj
 
2
p
c0  pcj (18)
and (16) becomes:
6c0G  8 ln 2c0G = 1 (19)
bringing about:
c0 =
1
(6  8 ln 2)G (20)
M = c0G =
1
6  8 ln 2 (21)
In this setting, each of the M active firms is associated with a marginal cost
c   cj   c0. Its market share is determined on the basis of (15). The number
of product varieties is set through (11), and the price of each product is given
by (10).
3 Conclusions
Multiproduct firms are not just large scale clones of single product firms. When
market conditions change, firms revise their policy in terms of price, production
volume, quality, etc., but also in terms of the number of oﬀered products. The
latter eﬀect is especially important in many service industries (telecommunica-
tions and media, in particular). Unfortunately, the industrial organization liter-
ature on multiproduct firms and endogenous scope choice is quite thin. Strategic
scope choice has been studied mostly in relation with entry deterrence (since
Judd (1985)) or as a response to entry (Johnson and Myatt (2003)). The deter-
mination of market structure when firms are heterogeneous and multiproduct
has not been directly addressed, to the best of my knowledge.
Fortunately, some new models proposed in the field of international eco-
nomics have potential to fill the gap. In this work, I have discussed a recent
model by Feenstra and Ma (2007, 2008), which I have extended and used to ad-
dress the issue of asymmetry in equilibrium. Cost diﬀerentials are at the basis of
diﬀerences in strategic responses by the firms. However, costs in multiproduct
firms are multidimensional, as they refer to the production of a specific good,
or to the addition of a new product line, or to fixed headquarters costs. Firms
may diﬀer in all these dimensions. Depending on the nature of these diﬀerences,
a diﬀerent asymmetric market structure may emerge.
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